Personal Information

  • Homepage Url: https://teacher.cufe.edu.cn/lixiaorong/en/index.htm
  • Doctoral Supervisor
  • Master Tutor
  • (Professor)
  • Name (Pinyin):

    lixiaorong
  • School/Department:

    School of Finance and Taxation, Central University of Finance and Economics
  • Administrative Position:

    Vice Dean of the School of Finance and Taxation
  • Education Level:

    With Certificate of Graduation for Doctorate Study
  • Business Address:

    Room 506, Building 10, Central University of Finance and Economics, No. 1, Shahe Section of Shunsha Road, Changping District, Beijing
  • Gender:

    Male
  • Contact Information:

  • Degree:

    Doctoral Degree in Management
  • Professional Title:

    Professor
  • Status:

    Employed
  • Academic Titles:

    副院长
  • Have Any Overseas Experience:

    Yes
  • Foreign Personnel or Not:

    No
  • Discipline:

    Public Finance

Other Contact Information

  • Email:

  • OfficePhone:

  • PostalAddress:

  • ZipCode:

国有企业高管权力与股价同步性

  • Date:2025-10-23
  • Institution:财政税务学院
  • Title of Paper:国有企业高管权力与股价同步性
  • Journal:厦门大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
  • Project Source:国家自然科学基金项目
  • Key Words:国有企业;高管权力;股价同步性;
  • Summary:伴随着国企改革的深入,国有企业的高管逐步获得了包括生产经营投资融资和人事方面的自主权,企业高管的权力不断增大。但是高管权力的增大也带来了严重的"内部人控制"问题。立足国有企业,从企业内部高管权力视角研究高管权力对股价同步性的影响,考察政府干预和产品市场竞争等对高管权力与股价同步性关系的影响,结果表明:(1)高管权力大小与股价同步性显著正相关;(2)处于政府干预多的地区的国有企业,高管权力对股价同步性有显著正向影响,反之,高管权力与股价同步性无显著关系;(3)处于产品市场竞争程度低的行业的国有企业,高管权力与股价同步性显著正相关,但当产品市场竞争加剧时,高管权力对股价同步性无显著影响。进一步研究还显示,较之于中央政府控股的国有企业,地方政府控制的国有企业的高管权力与股价同步性关系更为显著。
  • First Author:李小荣
  • Document Code:fdb5fae3c98045afba9f5d2168410c29
  • Page Number:2/85-95
  • Translation or Not:No
  • Date of Publication:2018-03-28

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